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CHAPTER 3 
Eight Other Questions about Explanation 
Angela Potochnik 
 
1. Introduction 
Philosophical accounts of scientific explanation are by and large categorized as 
law-based, unification, causal, mechanistic, etc. This type of categorization 
emphasizes one particular element of explanatory practices, namely, the type of 
dependence that is supposed to do the explaining. This question about scientific 
explanations is: in order for A to explain B, in what way must A account for B? 
Various philosophers have answered this question with the suggestion that, to 
explain, A must account for B according to natural law, or by reduction to an 
accepted phenomenon, or in virtue of causal dependence, or by mechanistic 
production, etc. Accordingly, students of philosophy of science are introduced to 
the deductive-nomological account, the unification account, various causal 
accounts, the mechanistic account, etc. 1  In recent years, causal accounts and 
																																																								
1 This categorization is of course not exhaustive, and it conceals a great deal of 
variety, for instance in how causes are to be understood for a causal account of 
explanation. What is important for present purposes is simply the element of 
explanatory practices that such a categorization focuses upon, namely, what form 
of dependence is explanatory. This construal is more commonly attached to causal 
and mechanistic accounts of explanation than to unification or D-N accounts, but I 
believe it suits the latter accounts as well. Friedman (1974), a prominent advocate 
of a unification account, articulates the question of explanation as that of the 
	 2 
mechanistic accounts, which also require causal dependence, have enjoyed broad 
appeal.  
 There are, of course, many other features of explanatory practices aside 
from the type of dependence that counts as explanatory. And philosophers 
disagree significantly about the nature of some of these other features as well. But 
those disagreements tend to be formulated as downstream issues about a particular 
account of explanation. In other words, the defining feature of an account of 
explanation is typically the posited form of explanatory dependence – is it a 
causal account, a law-based account, or something else? Only once this is settled 
do most philosophers consider other elements of explanatory practices. For 
example, one might embrace Woodward's version of a causal account of 
explanation, where causation is understood in terms of difference-making and 
invariance is taken to be explanatorily important. This leads to an emphasis on the 
value of general explanations like the ideal gas law (see Woodward 2003). Or one 
may embrace Salmon's version of a causal account of explanation, where 
causation requires mark-transmission and the explanatory value of causal 
processes is taken to be central (see Salmon 1984). This disqualifies some of the 
explanations that Woodward emphasizes, including the ideal gas law (or, at least, 
that is Salmon's view). In light of the prevailing philosophical focus on the type of 
explanatory dependence, though, these deep disagreements are treated as ancillary 
																																																																																																																																																							
relation between the phenomenon explained and the phenomenon doing the 
explaining. The D-N requirement of citing a natural law also coheres with this 
construal; that amounts to the requirement that A account for B in virtue of natural 
law. 
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concerns that merely distinguish different varieties of the causal account of 
explanation.  
 Overemphasis on this single element of explanatory practices has, I 
believe, eclipsed the significance of several other features of scientific 
explanations and philosophical disagreements about those features. In this paper I 
articulate eight such features and some of the philosophical views about each. I 
note dependencies among views of different features of explanation where those 
exist. But by and large, these are eight distinct and independent questions that can 
be posed about the nature of scientific explanation – or nine questions, if we 
include the question about the explanatory dependence relation(s). The purpose of 
this paper is not to develop an account of explanation, or to defend any one 
conception of these features. Instead, the aim is to further philosophical debate 
about the nature of scientific explanation by distinguishing among relatively 
independent features of explanatory practices and, for each, clarifying what is at 
issue. These various features of explanation fall roughly into three categories, 
reflected in the following three sections. There are questions to be asked about the 
role of human explainers in the project of scientific explanation (§2); 
representational questions about what explanations should actually be formulated 
and the relationship those explanations bear to other scientific projects (§3); and 
finally, ontological questions surrounding what, out in the world, explains (§4). 
This last category includes the classic question of what form of dependence is 
explanatory, but it includes other questions as well.  
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 Philosophical progress does not always involve resolving the main 
dispute. My aim in this paper is to contribute to a different kind of progress, 
namely, drawing attention to philosophical questions about scientific explanation 
that are distinct from whether all explanations require citing causal dependences, 
and other questions about the nature of explanatory dependence. It is in that sense 
that this is a paper about explanation beyond causation. I hope this results in the 
identification of features of explanation that have not been sufficiently explored; 
clarification of what is at stake between opposed views about those features; and 
thus the development of a more nuanced understanding of the philosophical issues 
surrounding scientific explanation. I believe there are at least eight questions to 
ask about scientific explanation, aside from whether causal dependence relations 
are always or ever explanatory. Let us now consider them.  
 
2. Human Explainers 
I begin by exploring open issues regarding human explainers. This may seem odd, 
given the overwhelming emphasis in the literature on the explanatory dependence 
relation, a question about ontology. But, as will become clear further below, I do 
so for a principled reason. There are two kinds of questions about human 
explainers. First, one can ask how the people doing the explaining, and the 
audiences for those explanations, influence explanatory practices. Second, one 
can ask to what degree those influences are relevant to a full-fledged account of 
explanation. I will begin with the latter question, whether philosophical accounts 
of explanation should address human influences on explanatory practices.  
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Question 1: Priority of Communication 
A debate has recently emerged, or perhaps been revived, surrounding the so-
called ontic versus communicative senses of explanation. This is at root a debate 
about the significance, or lack thereof, of human explainers to a philosophical 
account of scientific explanation. Proponents of an ontic or ontological approach 
to explanation judge the important features of scientific explanation to be 
independent of human influences. This includes independence from who in 
particular is doing the explaining, as well as the fact that all explanations are 
formulated by humans. A position like this has been advocated at different times 
and in different contexts by David Lewis (1986), Wesley Salmon (1989), Michael 
Strevens (2008), and Carl Craver (2014), among others. Other philosophers have 
adopted the opposed view that human explanatory practices must be the starting 
point for any account of explanation. Notable instances of this view include 
Sylvain Bromberger's (1966) treatment of why-questions, Bas van Fraassen's 
(1980) pragmatic account of explanation, and Peter Achinstein's (1983) 
illocutionary account. In contrast to a primarily ontic or ontological approach, one 
might think of these views collectively as a communicative approach to 
explanation. They all focus substantially on the communicative roles explanations 
are formulated to play, and look there for insight into the nature of scientific 
explanation. I have also motivated a communicative approach to explanation (see 
Potochnik 2015, forthcoming b). Ontic and communicative approaches thus 
provide two different answers to the question about the priority of communication 
to an account of explanation: the former judges the specificities of human 
	 6 
explainers to be irrelevant to a philosophical account of explanation, the latter 
takes them to be central.  
 One role of human explainers is wholly uncontroversial. Humans, and 
particular individuals at that, are responsible for formulating the requests for 
explanation. This means that human characteristics and idiosyncrasies find their 
way into what explananda are targeted by scientific explanations – that is, what 
events scientists attempt to explain and how those events are characterized. Some 
think this influence extends also to a more fine-grained characterization including 
not only the event to be explained, but also the alternative state of affairs the event 
is to be contrasted with, often referred to as the explanandum's contrast class. 
According to a contrastive approach to explanation, different explanations are 
warranted when explaining why a car crashed at night rather than not crashing at 
all, versus why a car crashed at night rather than crashing during the day.  
 From an ontic perspective, once the explanatory agenda is set (the 
explanandum specified, and perhaps the contrast class as well), the proper human 
influence on scientific explanations has been exhausted. All the remaining work is 
done by an account of explanatory dependence. The explanatory agenda simply 
determines what, out in the world, explains a given event. From a communicative 
perspective, in contrast, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Human influences on 
scientific explanations are taken to extend beyond setting the explanatory agenda, 
in one way or another influencing which explanation satisfactorily accounts for 
some explanandum and contrast class. For example, on van Fraassen's (1980) 
account, human characteristics and concerns also influence the explanatory 
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relation itself, that is, the relationship an explanation should bear to the event to 
be explained.  
 If human explainers, their interests and idiosyncrasies, are taken to be 
central to the enterprise of explaining, then other questions are raised about the 
relationship an explanation must bear to its audience, and what is required for an 
explanation to succeed in explaining. For this reason, much of what I say below 
about the other questions about human explainers presupposes a communicative 
approach to explanation. One can certainly recognize additional questions about 
human explainers without adopting a communicative approach to explanation. It's 
just that, from an ontic perspective on explanation, these further questions will 
tend to be seen as unimportant to philosophical questions about scientific 
explanation. For instance, Lewis (1986) dismisses questions around the 
“pragmatics” governing explanation as not distinctive questions for scientific 
explanation, but questions about human discourse in general. Similarly, a 
proponent of an ontic approach may take there to be interesting questions about 
the psychology of explanation, but deem these incidental to a philosophical 
account of explanation.   
 
Question 2: Connection to Understanding 
Another question about the human element of explanation that has recently 
received more attention is the nature of the relationship between explanation and 
understanding. The basic question is whether explanation and understanding are 
inextricably linked. One might wonder whether any explanation must result in 
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understanding in order to succeed. And one might wonder whether any and all 
understanding must issue from an explanation.2 
 Consider, first, the question of whether an explanation is necessary for 
understanding. Peter Lipton (2009) has argued that understanding can be 
possessed in circumstances in which we would hesitate to say there is an 
explanation. One such circumstance is understanding via tacit causal knowledge 
gained from images, the use of physical models, or physical manipulations. 
Lipton also argues that understanding can emerge from examining exemplars, or 
from modal information. In his view, none of these sources of understanding are 
of the right sort to give rise to explanations of the phenomena they help one 
understand. This is because, according to Lipton, an explanation must be able to 
be communicated, at least to oneself (so cannot be tacit), and must contain 
information about the object of understanding, that is, about why something in 
fact came about (which modal information arguably does not). Notice that the first 
of these requirements presumes something about the human element of 
explanation, namely, that any scientific explanation must play the proper 
communicative role.  
 Strevens (2013), in contrast, argues that there is no understanding but by 
way of explanations. In his view, understanding a phenomenon just is to grasp a 
correct explanation of that phenomenon. Strevens responds directly to some of 
Lipton’s purported cases of understanding without explanation. He disputes 
Lipton’s claim that explanations must be explicit, able to be communicated; in his 																																																								
2  De Regt (2013) provides a nice summary of the debate surrounding these 
questions. 
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view, tacit understanding simply arises from grasping a tacit explanation. Strevens 
and Lipton thus disagree about a prior issue, namely the significance of the 
communicative sense of explanation. As we have already seen, Strevens adopts an 
ontic approach, deeming the communicative purposes of explanations 
unimportant to an account of explanation. Strevens also argues that, when 
something tacit like physical intuition is the source of understanding, this 
understanding arises only in virtue of the accuracy of the physical intuition. He 
says, of a particular example, “it amounts to genuine understanding why, I 
suggest, only insofar as the psychologically operative pretheoretical physical 
principles constitute a part of the correct physical explanation” (see Strevens 
2013: 514). For Strevens, it is precisely the ontic element of explanations – that 
they track an explanatory dependence relation – that is supposed to fill the gap 
between intuition and legitimate explanation.  
 Besides this debate of whether explanation is necessary to generate 
understanding, there is also a question of whether any explanation must be 
sufficient to produce understanding. Can there be a (successful) explanation that 
does not generate understanding, or that does not even have the potential to do so? 
This question seems to not often be addressed explicitly, at least not as formulated 
here. But a position on the issue is suggested by those who affirm the importance 
of an account of explanation accounting for the production of understanding. This 
move is one way of affirming the importance of an explanation connecting in the 
right way to its human audience. For example, Hempel (1965) motivated the 
classic deductive-nomological account of explanation with the idea that 
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deductions from laws of nature show that “the occurrence of the phenomenon was 
to be expected,” and that “it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to 
understand why the phenomenon occurred” (337). Explanatory dependence 
relations out in the world are clearly insufficient for producing understanding. To 
generate understanding, information about those relations must be communicated 
to an audience, and must be communicated in a way that leads to the cognitive 
achievement of understanding. The opposite view on this question – that 
explanations need not generate understanding – seems to follow from a strongly 
ontic approach to explanation, where explanations exist out in the world, even if 
they are never identified or communicated.  
 
Question 3: Psychology of Explanation 
A third topic that relates to human explainers is the psychology of explanation. 
Explanation in general and scientific explanation in particular is a topic of 
empirical research in cognitive psychology. That research aims to uncover the 
cognitive roles played by explanation, and what features accepted explanations 
tend to possess. For example, Lombrozo (2011) surveys empirical research 
suggesting that the act of explaining improves learning of general patterns and 
causal structure. She also discusses research suggesting a broad preference for 
simple explanations and explanations that are highly general. Philosophical 
accounts of explanation can differ in the degree of importance they attach to the 
psychological elements of explanation, the type of relevance those psychological 
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elements are supposed to have, and (if relevant) which psychological elements of 
explanation they take to be significant.  
 If the communicative roles explanations play are taken to be central to the 
nature of explanation, then why and how explanations are in fact formulated is 
directly relevant to a philosophical account of explanation. On this approach 
explanations cannot succeed without being accepted as explanatory, so what 
features humans value in explanations and explanations’ cognitive purposes 
influence the features explanations should possess. Some advocates of a strongly 
ontic approach to explanation instead hold that the important features of 
explanation are independent of the features of those formulating and receiving 
explanations. In that case, research into the psychology of explanation is at most 
indirectly relevant to the norms of explanation. Our intuitions about what is 
explanatory may track the norms of explanation, but they cannot influence them.  
 
3. Explanations as Representations 
A second category of philosophical questions about scientific explanation regards 
representation. As with human explainers, one can ask what relevance 
representational decisions have to a philosophical account of scientific 
explanation. And, as with the first category of questions, granting a role for 
questions of representation introduces downstream questions, such as what should 
be represented in an explanation, and with what fidelity. These are questions 
about the role that abstraction and idealization should play in scientific 
explanations. Finally, as I discuss below, debate about the representational 
	 12 
features of explanation relates also to questions about the relationship between 
explanation and other scientific aims.  
 
Question 4: Priority of Representation 
Just as one can question whether human explainers and explanations’ 
communicative and cognitive roles shape scientific explanations in a 
philosophically significant way, so too one can ask whether representational 
decisions shape scientific explanations in a way that is central to providing a 
philosophical account of explanation. Since representational decisions can be 
made for purposes of improved communication or cognition, these two questions 
may be related, and I suspect they have sometimes been conflated. But some who 
embrace an ontological approach to explanation afford a central role in an account 
of explanation to representational decisions, but not for communicative or 
cognitive purposes. A prime example is Strevens' (2008) kairetic account of 
explanation. Strevens develops what he calls a two-factor account of explanation. 
The first factor is an account of the type of metaphysical dependence relation that 
can be explanatory, and the second factor is a separate account that determines 
which facts about such relations belong in any given explanation. This second 
factor is at least in part a question of representation. Evidence of this is that a 
central feature of Strevens’ account is the determination of the right degree of 
generality, or abstractness, of an explanation. This is a matter about how to 
represent the world – with greater or less detail. Indeed, in Strevens’ view, citing a 
general law simply is to cite the underlying physical mechanism, but the former is 
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a better explanation (see Strevens 2008: 129-130). The difference can't be 
metaphysical, then, but representational.  
 And so, within an ontological (versus communicative) approach to 
explanation, there is still a question of primacy to an account of explanation of 
facts out in the world or how we go about representing those facts. Some 
proponents of an ontological approach think that the ontological side – the nature 
of explanatory dependence relations – is where all of the work, or at least all of 
the important work, is located. For a good example of this, see Craver (2014). 
Others, like Strevens, think there are significant questions about how the 
explanatory dependence relations are represented.  
 Also analogous to, but distinct from, the case of the 
ontological/communicative divide is the question of whether the ontological 
dimension of explanation is always “upstream” from, that is logically prior to, to 
any representational dimension of explanation. This can be understood as the 
question of what needs to be settled first in order to get traction on any other 
questions about explanation. On this I believe Strevens and Craver would agree: 
the type of explanatory dependence, and the nature of that dependence in some 
particular phenomenon to be explained, must be settled first. Put another way, 
their view is that making true claims about explanatory dependence is the primary 
determinant of the content of explanations. Arnon Levy (draft) suggests, against 
this kind of a view, that the “goodness” of an explanation might be enhanced by 
sacrificing some truth. This might be so if explanations can be improved by 
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incorporating idealizations, or assumptions recognized as false.3 One such view is 
advocated by Robert Batterman (see, e.g., Batterman 2002, 2009). He argues that 
one central form of explanation, what he calls asymptotic explanation, is 
impossible without idealization. If this is right, it requires granting that some 
questions about how our explanations should represent must be settled prior to – 
or at least independently from – what, out in the world, they should represent.  
 
Question 5: The Representational Aims of Explanation 
The weaker claim articulated above about the representational features of 
explanations is that those features can be distinctive and warrant consideration, 
even if they are “downstream” from explanations’ ontological features. If one 
grants at least this much, then this introduces questions about what, and how, the 
explanations generated in science should represent. In particular, when (if ever) 
should explanations represent more abstractly, by including less detail, and when 
(if ever) should explanations represent less accurately, by including idealizations? 
If one holds the stronger view that the representational requirements for 
explanation can influence explanations’ ontological features, then this opens up 
additional possibilities for when explanations should omit or falsify some details. 
Views abound about the role of abstraction and idealization in scientific 
explanations; some of those views suggest this weaker commitment regarding the 
representational features of explanation, whereas others require the stronger.  
 																																																								
3 Strevens (2008) has a view of idealizations' explanatory role that does not stray 
in this way from a fully ontological approach to explanation. 
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Consider first the matter of an explanation's abstractness. Is more detail (about 
explanatorily relevant dependence) always better than less detail? Or are 
explanations ever improved by omitting information? The issue is a bit subtle, as 
much rides on what is built into the determination of “explanatorily relevant 
dependence.” This is an ontological issue, and as such, I'm postponing it until the 
next section. Strevens’ view again provides an illustration of both the subtlety and 
also a position on the question of abstraction. At first glance, Strevens’ answer is, 
definitively, that explanations should leave out lots of information. For him, the 
raw material of explanations is causal entailment; this is the first factor in his two-
factor account. But then there's a question of which representations of causal 
entailment are most explanatory; answering this is the job of the second factor. 
Strevens argues that only causal factors that are difference-makers (in his sense) 
should be included in an explanation; this results in explanations with the right 
degree of generality and abstractness.  
 But this doesn't fully settle the issue, as there's still a question of how 
many difference-making factors an explanation should feature. Should 
explanations be “elongated,” that is, expanded to include factors that made a 
difference to the cited difference-making factors? Should explanations be 
“deepened,” that is, expanded to include a physical explanation for any high-level 
laws that are cited? Both of these are ways of incorporating additional details and, 
thus, making explanations less abstract, but they are distinct issues from each 
other, and distinct also from the first way in which Strevens thinks explanations 
should be abstract. Strevens’ answers are that elongation is optional but it 
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improves an explanation, and that deepening is compulsory (see, e.g., 2008: 133). 
However, this is not so for “causal covering-laws,” such as the kinetic theory of 
gases, since as I mentioned above, Strevens thinks that citing such a law is the 
same thing as citing the underlying physical mechanism (129-130).  
 I said that Strevens’ view illustrates not only how one might take 
abstractness to be a desirable feature of explanations, but also the subtlety of the 
issue. Strevens encourages abstract explanations in one sense (omitting non-
difference-makers), while allowing them and prohibiting them in two other senses 
(non-elongated explanations and non-deep explanations, respectively). As for the 
subtlety of the issue, it is difficult to determine which of these positions concerns 
the question of what things are explanatory (i.e., the ontological element of 
explanation) and which, if any, concerns the question of how explanatory things 
should be represented. That non-difference makers should always be omitted 
seems to be an ontological question of what facts about the world are explanatory; 
Strevens holds that only difference-makers (in his sense) explain. Yet the matter is 
murkier for his positions regarding elongation and depth. Elongation seems to be 
a question of how many of the explanatory dependence relations to represent, so 
perhaps this issue is not ontological but representational. I find the requirement of 
depth to be more puzzling still. Strevens claims that this requirement is “quite 
consistent with a high degree of abstraction” (130), and that an abstract causal 
covering-law is, from an ontological perspective, one and the same explanation as 
the physical mechanism(s) underpinning it. He says the former has a 
“communicative shortcoming” but not an “explanatory shortcoming” (131). But 
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this suggests that determination of difference-making is, for Strevens, not purely 
an ontological matter after all. A causal covering-law omits information about the 
underlying physical mechanism because those details are not difference-makers. 
But the ontological explanation provided by a causal covering-law is supposed to 
be the same as what would be provided by citing the underlying physical 
mechanism. The determination of difference-making seems, then, to regard not 
the ontological explanation but what details are included – that is,  represented – 
in a causal model.  
 There are, of course, other views about how abstract explanations should 
be. Like Strevens’, these other views are by and large developed within the 
structure of particular accounts of the explanatory dependence relation. But it 
needn't be so. One might bracket the issue of the nature of explanatory 
dependence by approaching the issue of explanations’ abstractness from the 
perspective of existing explanatory practices and findings about explanation from 
cognitive psychology (introduced as Question 3 above).  
 Let’s move on to the issue of explanations' fidelity, that is, whether 
explanations can and should include idealizations. As I mentioned above, one 
notable advocate of idealized explanations is Batterman (2002, 2009). Batterman 
argues that there is an important style of explanation, what he calls asymptotic 
explanation, that relies essentially on the use of idealizations. Roughly, the idea is 
that explanations of how phenomena behave as they approach a limit are enabled 
by idealizing parameters as having an extreme value of zero or infinity. If this is 
right, some explanations are impossible without including idealizations. In 
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contrast, Norton (2012) acknowledges the importance of this style of explanation, 
but he disputes the claim that setting a parameter to zero or infinity is an 
idealization; he takes these simply to be approximations. Like Batterman, 
Strevens also defends the explanatory value of idealizations, but he limits their 
role to standing in for non-difference-makers, thereby expressing what did not 
make a difference to the phenomenon. Alisa Bokulich (2011) endorses a position 
somewhat between these views, for she argues that “fictionalized” representations 
can explain, but that they do so by correctly capturing the explanatory 
counterfactual dependence. It's worth pointing out that Bokulich takes such 
explanations to be non-causal in virtue of the fictions they incorporate, because in 
her view fictional entities cannot have causal powers. This is a view about the 
ontological question of explanatory dependence that is informed by a position 
regarding the representational question of idealized explanations, rather than the 
other way around.  
 Many other philosophers have views about idealizations’ role in 
explanation, but I will mention my own view as a final example, since I take it to 
contrast nicely with Strevens’ and to exemplify a view of the relationship between 
communicative, representational, and ontological elements of explanation 
opposed to his. I think explanations employ idealizations not only to signal what 
did not make a difference to the phenomenon, but also (and more commonly) to 
signal that researchers’ interests lie elsewhere (Potochnik, forthcoming a). 
Adopting for the nonce Strevens’ view of the explanatory dependence relation, 
even important difference-makers might be idealized away in order to simplify an 
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explanation and draw attention to other difference-makers, the ones in which 
those formulating the explanation are primarily interested. This reverses the 
priority of communicative and ontological features of explanation. In my view it 
is the communicative or psychological needs of an explanation's audience that 
determines what should be veridically represented and what should be omitted or 
falsified, and that determination in turn sheds light on what sort of dependence is 
explanatory. I will not defend this idea here; I simply mention it as an alternative 
view of the explanatory role of idealizations.  
 
Question 6: Relationship to Other Scientific Aims 
Another question about scientific explanation regards its role in the scientific 
enterprise. In particular, one might wonder how explanation relates to other 
scientific aims. For example, Heather Douglas (2009) argues that the role of 
explanation in generating good predictions has been overlooked, and that this has 
weakened accounts of explanation. She says that explanations are a cognitive tool 
to aid in generating predictions, for they “help us to organize the complex world 
we encounter, making it cognitively manageable” (54). In direct opposition to this 
idea, I have argued that different scientific aims, including explanation and 
prediction, motivate different types of scientific activities and products (see 
Potochnik 2010a, 2015b, forthcoming a). On this view, a perfectly good 
explanation, such as an explanation that idealizes many important causal 
influences in order to represent the causal role of just one kind of factor, may be 
poorly suited as the basis for making predictions.  
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One might wonder why I include this in a list of questions about representational 
features of explanation. For one thing, notice that the two views I briefly 
characterized both regard explanations in their representational sense. Douglas's 
description of explanations as cognitive tools clearly is not about what facts out in 
the world are explanatory, but the useful ways in which scientists represent those 
explanatory facts. Only facts that are known and represented can be cognitive 
tools. Similarly, my contrasting view is not a view about the ontological 
dimension of explanation: whatever dependencies are explanatory presumably are 
also helpful in the formulation of predictions. The question is whether 
explanations actually formulated should also lend themselves to generating 
accurate predictions.  A view on this issue will have implications for the kind of 
representations our explanations should be, including their abstractness and 
fidelity. If explanations should support accurate predictions, then they must be 
accurate enough, and specific enough, about the full range of the applicable 
dependence relations to play this role. A strong view of the explanatory role of 
idealization thus commits me to a division between explanation and other 
scientific aims, including prediction.  
 
4. Ontic Explanations 
The third category of philosophical questions about scientific explanation I will 
discuss regards ontology. As with human explainers and the representational form 
of explanations, the two categories of questions discussed above, there is a 
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question of how central the ontological dimension of explanatory practices is to a 
philosophical account of explanation. There are also questions about the nature of 
this ontological dimension, that is, the form(s) of explanatory dependence. In 
contrast to the issues I have surveyed surrounding human explainers and 
representation, few deny that explanations’ ontological dimension is central to 
providing a philosophical account of explanation. Accordingly, most all 
philosophers who address scientific explanation engage with one or another 
ontological question about explanation, or at least grant the significance of those 
questions. Indeed, I suggested at the outset of this paper that attention to the 
nature of the explanatory dependence relation, which I take to be an ontological 
question, tends to eclipse many of these other disagreements about explanation. I 
begin the present section by discussing this question that’s at the center of so 
many philosophical accounts of explanation. I then move on to the question of the 
priority of the ontological dimension of explanation, and then discuss a further, 
arguably ontological question about explanation, namely the issue of level(s) of 
explanation.  
 
The Question of the Nature of Explanatory Dependence  
I have suggested that one ontological issue about explanation gets an undue share 
of philosophical attention. This is the matter of the explanatory dependence 
relation, the question of what, out in the world, explains.4 Many a philosophy of 																																																								
4 Note that accounts of explanatory dependence vary in the degree to which they 
are strictly ontic. For example, the deductive-nomological account takes 
explanation to occur among propositions about phenomena and laws, whereas 
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science course has contained a unit on scientific explanation that looks something 
like: scientific laws explain!; no, it must be causes; but, unification! This perhaps 
is continued with: causal mechanisms explain; or is it causal difference-makers? 
The more general question is sometimes introduced of whether there's a unitary 
account to give of the form of explanatory dependence. This is often yoked to the 
question of whether purely mathematical dependencies can ever be explanatory.  
 This question of what form(s) of dependence are of explanatory value in 
science is undoubtedly important, and the debate about how to answer this 
question rages on. Versions of a causal account of explanation have dominated the 
literature in recent decades, which is part of the motivation for this volume's focus 
on non-causal explanation. Above I described how Bokulich rejects a causal 
approach to causation because of the extensive fictions employed in explanations. 
Others who have challenged a causal approach focus directly on the nature of 
explanatory dependence. Some who have emphasized the explanatoriness of 
broad patterns think this undermines the idea that explanatory dependence is 
always causal. This includes, notably, advocates of the unification approach (see 
Friedman 1974), but also Batterman (2002) and others. Some of these accounts 
share with Bokulich's an acceptance of the explanatory significance of difference-
making, while denying that difference-making constitutes causal influence. Others 
focus on cases when the explanatory dependence seems to be purely mathematical 
(see Pincock 2012; Lange 2013). 
 																																																																																																																																																							
Craver (2014) argues that explanations are ultimately relations among phenomena 
out in the world. 
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 This is an important, live debate. But I hope it is clear from what I have 
said so far in this paper that developing a view of the explanatory dependence 
relation is not in itself sufficient to provide a philosophical account of scientific 
explanation. Too many other questions are left unanswered. Of course, many 
proponents of one or another view about the explanatory dependence relation 
have much to say about some of these other issues surrounding explanation. But 
far too often, those other issues are treated as merely add-on features to a core 
account, an account that is named for its commitment to some form of 
explanatory dependence. Instead, they are separate, partially independent 
questions about the nature of scientific explanation.  
 
Question 7: Priority of the Ontological Dimension 
I suspect that one reason the nature of the explanatory dependence relation has 
received the lion's share of philosophical attention is the common presumption 
that the ontological dimension of explanation is primary, or even solitary, in its 
importance. This raises the next question about the ontology of explanations I 
want to discuss, namely the centrality of this dimension as compared to the 
representational and communicative dimensions of explanation. This is the 
counterpart of Questions 1 and 4 in the previous two sections, about the priority of 
communication and representation, respectively, for explanation.  
 Few deny that dependence relations out in the world are relevant to what 
qualifies as an explanation. For our scientific explanations to succeed, they must 
track some dependence – of the right kind – that actually exists in the world. 
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Perhaps van Fraassen (1980) comes the closest to denying this, since he argues 
that there is not a unitary account to be given of explanatory dependence relations, 
that this depends on an explanation's communicative context. As we have already 
seen, many others think that the ontological issue of explanatory dependence is 
where all the work in providing an account of explanation, or at least all the 
important work, is located. Communicative influences are often relegated to the 
category of the ``pragmatics'' of explanation, and Lewis (1986) influentially 
argued that the pragmatics of explanation are nothing special, that is, are in no 
way distinct from the pragmatics of linguistic communication more generally. 
Craver (2014) holds an extreme version of an ontological, or ontic, view of 
explanation. He argues that what counts as an explanation is purely an ontological 
matter, not representational or communicative, for “our abstract and idealized 
representations count as conveying explanatory information in virtue of the fact 
that they represent certain kinds of ontic structures (and not others)” (29). 
 Views about the priority of the communicative sense of explanation or 
representational issues in explanation, the first and fourth questions discussed 
above, have obvious implications for this issue. If one grants the significance, or 
even primacy, of the audience's influence on the content of an explanation, then 
this amounts to rejecting a purely ontological approach to explanation. And if one 
grants the importance of representational matters, including whether and how 
explanations should abstract and idealize what they represent about the world, 
then one has at least strayed from an extreme ontic view like Craver’s. In contrast, 
a commitment to a view like Craver’s or Lewis’s can – and has – been used to 
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justify producing an account of explanation that consists solely of a view about 
the nature of explanatory dependence. Other views are in a confusing middle 
ground. As we saw in the previous section, Strevens explicitly claims that his 
account of explanation is ontological in nature, yet a good deal of that account 
focuses on representational issues, including both abstraction and idealization.  
 
Question 8: Level of Explanation 
Another well-identified question about explanation regards the proper level of 
explanation. Unlike many of the other questions about explanation I've surveyed 
so far, this issue is often treated separately from providing an overarching account 
of explanation. It also has been linked to positions on a range of other issues in 
philosophy of science, for example, about reductionism, ontology, and the 
relationships among different fields of science. Classic, reductionist approaches to 
the unity of science claimed that the reduction of all scientific findings to 
microphysical laws and happenings entailed the successful explanation of those 
findings in microphysical terms (see, e.g., Hempel 1948). An opposed position is 
to declare that some explanations are benefitted from being at a higher level than 
microphysics. This idea has been developed in a variety of ways by different 
philosophers over the years. In this context, “higher level” might mean more 
abstract, more general, invoking bigger entities, invoking laws outside of 
microphysics, or some combination of these. Putnam (1975) memorably 
illustrated high-level explanation with the example of explaining why a square 
peg with one-inch sides did not fit through a round hole with a one-inch diameter. 
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There continue to be proponents of high-level explanation (see, e.g., Weslake 
2010), pluralism about the proper levels of explanation (see, e.g., Potochnik 
2010b), and explanatory reductionism (see, e.g., Kim 2008).  
 The question of the proper level of explanation is plausibly about the 
ontological dimension of explanation. One might phrase the question as: what are 
the kinds of things that can explain? Are these always only microscopic particles 
and the laws governing them, or sometimes middle-sized objects and the 
relationships among them? And example of these options are, respectively, the 
molecular structure of Putnam's peg and board, and the geometric relationship 
obtaining between the peg and the hole in the board and the rigidity of the two 
objects. On the other hand, one might think of the question of the proper level of 
explanation as primarily or solely regarding representational decisions. Recall 
Strevens’ claim that to cite a causal covering-law just is to cite the physical 
mechanism responsible for said law. It seems that, in his view, the ontological 
element of those explanations is identical – all that distinguishes them is 
representational differences. Yet one of the two explanations is at a higher level, 
in the sense of being more abstract and avoiding reference to the fundamental 
physics of the phenomenon. I’m not inclined to accept this interpretation of the 
issue. I agree, of course, that the proper degree of abstraction is a representational 
issue. But in my view, representational decisions can't help but influence 
explanations’ ontic features, that is, what out in the world explains (see Potochnik 
forthcoming b).  
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5. Conclusion 
I began this paper with the suggestion that the debate about the nature of 
explanatory dependence has eclipsed several other philosophical questions about 
scientific explanation. What followed, in the bulk of the paper, was a rapid-fire 
listing of eight of these other questions, with brief discussions of the nature of 
each question and a sampling of views about them. I have tried to articulate these 
questions about explanation in a way that clarifies any relations of dependence 
among views about different questions, and that emphasizes the independence of 
each from an account of the explanatory dependence relation.  
 These questions about explanation fall, roughly, into three categories. 
They are: questions about the human element of explanation, that is, whether and 
how explanations are shaped by communicative purposes and cognitive needs 
(§2); questions about the representational element of explanation, that is, whether 
and how explanations are shaped by representational decisions (§3); and questions 
about the ontic element of explanation, that is, how explanations are shaped by 
features of the world and the relationships they bear to the phenomena to be 
explained (§4). The logically primary question in each category is whether and to 
what degree that element of explanation is relevant to giving a philosophical 
account of explanation. Other questions in each category regard the nature of that 
element's relevance. For the human element of explanation, these questions 
include how explanations (generated by humans) relate to human understanding, 
and the cognitive psychology of explanation. For the representational element of 
explanation, these questions include how explanations should represent – in 
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particular whether and when they should abstract and idealize, and the 
relationship explanations generated in science bear to other scientific aims, such 
as prediction. Finally, for the ontic element of explanation, there's the familiar 
question of the nature of explanatory dependence, as well as the question of the 
proper level(s) of explanation.  
 Historically, the ontic element of explanation has been presumed to be of 
either central or sole relevance. Even accounts of explanation that focus on 
explanations in the representational sense, such as the deductive-nomological and 
unification accounts, placed the source of explanatoriness on the ontic side – e.g. 
for the D-N account, the laws of nature cited and facts accurately described, and 
for Friedman's (1974) unification account, in a relation among phenomena. With a 
few prominent exceptions, there has been little attention devoted to defending the 
centrality of the ontic element of explanation. In contrast, attention to 
communicative elements of explanation must always begin with a defense of the 
relevance of those issues, or else risk the dismissive response that the discussion 
is irrelevant to the real issues about explanation. I began this paper with questions 
about the human element of explanation in order to demonstrate that the 
traditional ordering of priorities for an account of explanation is not inevitable. 
Despite the strong precedent for accounts of explanation that are ontic-first or 
ontic-only, there are significant questions about how our explanations are shaped 
by communicative purposes and cognitive needs, and whether and how these are 
distinctively human. Those questions often can be addressed directly, rather than 
merely as add-on components to an account of the ontic element of explanation. 
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Furthermore, how these questions about the communicative element of 
explanation are answered can have implications for an account of the ontic 
element of explanation. This is so for my own view of explanation (see Potochnik 
forthcoming a).  
 The recognition that there are other questions about explanation is, of 
course, not uniquely mine. As I have surveyed here, there already exists 
philosophical work on most or all of the topics I’ve listed. My hope is that the 
contribution of this paper consists partly in the delineation and categorization of 
these many issues, and partly in the demonstration of their distance from the 
question of what, out in the world, explains. My aim in surveying so many 
questions is to illustrate the vast space for different kinds of disagreements about 
scientific explanation. Surely other philosophical questions about scientific 
explanation exist even beyond those I have detailed here. Philosophers of science 
working on, or considering work on, the nature of scientific explanation: I urge 
you to consider this range of largely independent questions about scientific 
explanation. Choose a question to explicitly develop a view on; show 
interrelationships among views one might hold about a few of these features; 
articulate still further questions in need of answers. If you must, develop a new 
account of the sort of dependence that is explanatory. But please, do not be 
convinced that the main philosophical question about explanation is whether 
causes, laws, or something else are the kind of thing that explains.  
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